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Taxation and Incentives in the Business Enterprise
By David Gamage1 & Shruti Rana2

I. Introduction
Tax law is intimately connected to enterprise law.3 In many legal practices,
lawyers who serve enterprise clients regularly turn to tax lawyers for advice on
structuring transactions. Often, the enterprise lawyers first devise a transaction in order
to further some business-law related end, and then turn to tax lawyers to insure that the
transaction is structured in a tax-favorable manner. In other instances, tax lawyers
devise transactions in order to minimize an enterprise client’s tax liabilities, and then
turn to the enterprise lawyers to structure the transaction in accordance with the client’s
non-tax goals. Enterprise lawyers and tax lawyers thus need a mutual understanding
so that they can work together to meet their clients’ tax and non-tax goals. At a
minimum, enterprise and tax lawyers need to know when to ask each other for advice
and when to defer to each other’s expertise.
Similarly, anyone interested in the design of enterprise law must engage with
taxation. Tax laws significantly impact all of the major incentive bargains analyzed in
this volume. The agreements managers reach with employees, shareholders, and
creditors are all regularly structured with an eye to tax considerations.4
Tax law potentially offers policymakers a powerful tool for influencing the
incentive bargains that comprise the business enterprise.5 Even if policymakers do not
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wish to use tax law as a tool for regulating the business enterprise, tax laws will
nevertheless remain an important background force that policymakers must take into
account. It is impossible to design a completely neutral tax system with respect to
enterprise law’s incentive bargains; taxation will inevitably impact these bargains,
whether policymakers wish it to or not. Consequently, a thorough examination of
enterprise law requires engaging with tax law and policy.

II. The Tax Policy Perspective
To understand why it is impossible to design a tax system that is neutral with
respect to the incentive bargains that comprise the business enterprise, it is useful to
begin by evaluating the goals of taxation. Anyone interested in the design of enterprise
law must engage with the tax system and hence must understand the tax policy
perspective on the interactions between taxation and enterprise law.
Nevertheless, before proceeding to evaluate the goals of taxation, we should first
briefly discuss possible underlying models of government behavior. Much of tax policy
scholarship adopts what might be called the beneficial dictator model.6 This scholarship
asks how a government concerned only with public welfare should design tax policy.
This scholarship thus takes little account of the possibility that government actors may
be influenced by goals other than promoting the general welfare.
In contrast, tax scholarship operating within the public choice tradition frequently
adopts what might be called the leviathan model of government behavior.7 Under this
model, governments are assumed to act so as to maximize the government’s power,
thus usually raising as much tax revenue as the government can get away with.
Scholars who analyze tax policy based on leviathan models often focus on prescribing
mechanisms for constraining the power of government actors. Questions related to
determining what is the ideal tax system are viewed as less important, because a
leviathan government would never enact an ideal tax system.
Between the extremes of the beneficial dictator and leviathan models, what might
be called the interest group bargaining model assumes that governments sometimes
pursue the general welfare and other times attempt to reward narrow interest groups
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that can help politicians win reelection.8 As a general rule of thumb, scholars often
assume that governments are more concerned with broad public opinion and the
general welfare when issues are highly salient, and that governments are more
concerned with rewarding narrow interest groups when issues are less salient.9
Because our goal is to explain why it is not possible to design a tax system that is
completely neutral with respect to the incentive bargains that comprise the business
enterprise, we mostly adopt the beneficial dictator model in this chapter. Yet we do not
mean to suggest that real-world governments operate following the beneficial dictator
model. In our view, interest group bargaining models offer better predictions of realworld government behavior than do either the beneficial dictator or leviathan models.
The beneficial dictator model does not sufficiently take account of the fact that
politicians in democracies rely on the support of narrow interest groups whose goals do
not always involve promoting the general welfare. And the leviathan model ignores that
democratic governments are composed of many individual politicians facing collective
action problems, such that even politicians unconcerned with the general welfare often
have little incentive to prioritize expanding the government’s powers. For enterprise law
scholars then, it is important to keep in mind that taxation will often affect enterprise law
due to rules that governments design for the benefit of particular narrow interest groups
rather than for the goal of advancing the general welfare through sound tax policy.
A. The Goal of Minimizing Excess Burden
The most important reason why governments enact tax laws is to raise revenues
for funding government spending. Yet a central dilemma of tax policy is that taxing any
activity typically leads taxpayers to engage in less of that activity.10 Hence, for example,
taxing the income from work incentivizes taxpayers to shift from work to leisure; taxing
purchased goods incentivizes taxpayers to buy less of the taxed goods; and taxing
investment returns incentivizes taxpayers to make fewer taxable investments.
When taxation induces taxpayers to engage in less of a taxed activity, both the
individual taxpayers and the government are made worse off. The taxpayers are made
worse off because the taxpayers have shifted from a more desired activity – the activity
the taxpayers would have preferred to engage in were it not for the tax – to a less
8
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desired activity. The government is made worse off because the government receives
no revenue to the extent that taxpayers shift to untaxed activities. When taxation
causes taxpayers to shift to untaxed alternative activities then, society as a whole is
made worse off. This harm to society that results from tax-induced changes to taxpayer
behavior is often called “excess burden” or “deadweight loss.”11
Consequently, a simple maxim for designing optimal tax policy is that
governments should focus on taxing “inelastic” activities – activities for which taxpayers
do not shift their behavior much in response to taxation. Another simple maxim is that it
is usually best to make the tax base as comprehensive as possible; the more activities
that are taxed at the same rate, the fewer options taxpayers have for shifting to untaxed
or lower taxed alternative activities.
Unfortunately, governments find it very difficult to tax capital income – the income
that taxpayers earn from investments. Governments that rely significantly on income
taxes, such as the U.S. and Japan, thus face enormous problems in enacting a
comprehensive tax base with respect to capital income.12 Exacerbating this problem,
wealthy taxpayers have developed a number of techniques for transforming the
monetary compensation they receive from working into a form that is taxed as capital
income under an income tax rather than as labor income.13 Hence, the difficulties
governments face in taxing capital income threaten governments’ ability to collect taxes
from wealthy taxpayers even on their labor income. And the techniques that taxpayers
use to minimize their tax liabilities, both with respect to capital income and labor income,
create significant excess burden beyond the revenue loss to the government.
The transactions that wealthy taxpayers use to reduce their capital income tax
liabilities, and the anti-abuse rules that governments develop in order to combat these
transactions, have significant impacts on enterprise law. For instance, the income tax
laws of both the U.S. and Japan create a significant bias for debt-financing as opposed
to equity financing.14 Sophisticated taxpayers respond to this bias both by shifting from
equity financing to debt financing and by creating new hybrid financial instruments that
maintain some of the economic characteristics of equity while being taxed as debt.
11
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These tax-motivated transactions then significantly impact corporate governance, as
equity holder and debt holders have different control rights and as enterprise law must
cope with the control rights granted to the holders of hybrid instruments.
B. The Goal of Promoting Distribution Policy
If policymakers cared only about the goal of minimizing excess burden, then
there would be a simple solution for designing the optimal tax system. Under a “head
tax”, each citizen is taxed the exact same fixed amount – an amount that remains
constant regardless of any activities or behaviors the taxpayers engages in. Hence, a
head tax assesses tax liabilities based on an activity that is highly inelastic – being a
citizen. The only option taxpayers have for escaping a head tax is to leave the country
and renounce their citizenship.
The reason that governments do not exclusively rely on head taxes for raising
revenues is distribution.15 Even the most conservative of commentators generally agree
that poorer citizens should not be assessed the same tax liabilities as richer citizens.
Note in this regard that even a pure “flat tax” is in no way a head tax. Under a pure flat
tax, all citizens are assessed tax liabilities based on the same percentage of their
income or consumption. Because richer individuals have higher income and
consumption than poorer individuals, a pure flat tax thus results in richer citizens paying
far higher tax liabilities than poorer citizens. And conservative advocates of a flat tax
rarely call for a pure flat tax. Instead, most proposals for a flat tax include an exemption
amount, wherein income or consumption under a specified threshold is exempt from
tax, thus making flat tax proposals even more progressive by reducing the effective tax
rates on poorer taxpayers as compared to richer taxpayers.
A major reason why many support imposing taxes on corporations and large
business enterprises is based on distribution. Liberals often argue that the incidence of
taxes imposed on large business enterprises falls primarily on monetary capital
providers, who tend to be far wealthier than workers or consumers.16 However, it is not
at all clear the extent to which the incidence of taxes on large business enterprises
actually falls on capital; much recent scholarship suggests that workers and consumers
may bear the majority of the burden of these taxes.17
15
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A simple maxim for evaluating tax incidence – who bears the economic burden of
a tax – evaluates the relative elasticity of the parties that might potentially be subject to
the tax.18 With respect to corporate taxes and other taxes on large business
enterprises, the question then becomes the extent to which workers are more able to
switch jobs if their salaries are lowered, as compared to the extent to which consumers
are more able to switch to buying alternative products if prices are raised, and as
compared to the extent to which monetary capital providers are comparatively more
able to switch their investment choices if the expected returns are lowered. Taxing
large business enterprises reduces their profitability, which means that less money will
be available to pay workers, keep prices low for consumers, and reward monetary
capital providers. For distributional considerations, the question is which of these
groups comparatively bears the greatest burdens from the tax.
Looking beyond taxes directly imposed on large business enterprises,
distributional considerations also motivate other tax instruments that significantly affect
enterprise law’s incentive bargains. Both the U.S. and Japan have a progressive
structure to their income taxes, wherein higher-income taxpayers face higher tax rates
than do lower-income taxpayers.19 The higher marginal income tax rates that highincome taxpayers face under a progressive income tax impact the compensation
packages paid to mangers and to other high-income workers, as higher marginal tax
rates increase the incentives to structure compensation packages in a tax-advantaged
fashion. For example, under the income tax laws of both Japan and the U.S., fringe
benefits and performance-based compensation can often be made tax favorable as
compared to wage salaries, thus impacting the form of compensation paid to managers
and workers, and thereby altering the incentive bargains reached between managers,
employees, and monetary capital providers.
C. The Goal of Promoting Desirable Behavior
Beyond the goals of raising revenues while minimizing excess burden and
promoting socially desirable redistribution, taxes are also used to influence taxpayer
behavior. By taxing activities that generate “negative externalities” (harms that affect
parties external to the taxpayer), or by granting tax credits or deductions for activities
that generate positive externalities (benefits that accrue to parties external to the
taxpayer), governments can induce taxpayers to internalize the externalities so that the
18
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taxpayer’s decisions maximize social welfare rather than just the taxpayer’s own
welfare. Taxes designed to control externalities are sometimes called “Pigouvian
taxes.” A classic example are taxes imposed on pollution, which if set correctly can
cause the taxpayers to pollute only to the extent that the social benefit of the activity
causing the pollution exceeds the harm caused by the pollution.20
Pigouvian taxes are less important with respect to enterprise law than are taxes
designed to raise revenues and promote distribution policy. Yet both corporate and
individual income taxes are filled with tax incentives designed to promote behavior that
governments deem socially beneficial. These Pigouvian tax provisions can and do
affect the incentive bargains of the business enterprise.
D. The Goal of Enacting Fiscal Stimulus
The final tax policy goal that we will discuss is probably the least important for
enterprise law. Tax laws can play an important role in macroeconomic stabilization
policy. Ideally, tax systems should be structured so as to provide fiscal stimulus during
temporary economic downturns and to take away that stimulus during upturns. When
government budgets do not need to be balanced in the short run, income taxes and
especially corporate income taxes can provide stimulus, because these forms of
taxation take far less revenue from the economy during economic downturns than
during periods of strong economic growth.21 The manner in which tax laws are
designed to promote fiscal stimulus can affect enterprise law by impacting the timing of
investment decisions and the attractiveness of debt as opposed to equity financing,
which can affect the incentive bargains between managers and monetary capital
providers. As both Japan and the U.S. have been facing sustained periods of stagnant
economic growth, the fiscal stimulus policies these governments adopt may carry
significant stakes for the incentive bargains negotiated between managers and
monetary capital providers.

III. Taxation and Enterprise Law’s Incentive Bargains
Other chapters in this volume will analyze some of the specific ways in which
taxation and other government activities affect enterprise law’s incentive bargains. We
aim in this chapter only to provide a brief overview of the goals of tax policy and how
20
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these goals inevitably lead to taxation impacting enterprise law. Our purpose is to
assist readers interested in the design of enterprise law to understand the tax policy
perspective so as to facilitate understanding between those interested in enterprise
policy and those interested in tax policy. Having outlined the goals of tax policy, we can
now analyze how managers, employees, and monetary capital providers respond to
taxation.
However, as a preface, it is worth noting that while the laws governing
enterprises and taxation are often similar in the U.S. and Japan,22 the goals of
policymakers and other stakeholders often differ. For instance, many Japanese
companies still place relatively greater emphasis on promoting the long-term welfare of
their employees.23 It is important to recognize and account for differences in legal
cultures and context in considering the varied ways in which managers, employees, and
monetary capital providers might respond to taxation.
A. How Managers Respond to Taxation
Individuals seek at least three rewards from their participation in the workplace:
(a) monetary compensation, (b) non-monetary compensation such as fringe benefits,
and (c) work-related power and prestige. Managers seek these rewards just as much
as do non-managerial workers.
Within most income tax systems, monetary compensation is the mostly highly
taxed, non-monetary fringe benefits often go only partially taxed or are not taxed at all,
and work-related power and status are rarely taxed.24 The reason for this disparity is
valuation problems and concerns related to administrability. Tax agencies have no
ready means for assessing the value of work-related power and status, and it is also
prohibitively difficult to assess the value of many forms of fringe benefits.
Predictably then, taxation biases managers toward seeking more untaxed fringe
benefits and work-related power and prestige than they would in the absence of
taxation. The higher the tax rates, the larger the bias against monetary compensation
and toward these alternative workplace rewards.
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Perhaps this bias plays out most powerfully in incentivizing managers to build
empires through mergers and acquisitions and through investing earnings in
questionable expansion projects rather than returning earnings to shareholders.
Managers seek to build workplace empires partially for the rewards these empires offer
in terms of work-related power and status. Were the managers to forgo these power
and status related rewards in order to focus exclusively on maximizing profits, at best
the mangers would receive higher monetary compensation (which is subject to taxation)
in place of the foregone power and status (which is not subject to taxation).
This empire-building bias is only one of the ways in which taxation affects
managers’ incentives. As we noted earlier, taxation affects the forms of monetary
compensation offered to managers and other employees, and this in itself can affect
mangers incentives, particularly to the extent taxation biases compensation packages
toward stock options and other incentive-based forms of compensation as opposed to
guaranteed salaries. Managers typically have significant power to negotiate
compensation packages that are designed in a tax-favorable fashion.
B. How Employees Respond to Taxation
Employees have similar incentives to managers, although many (especially
lower-income) employees may be relatively more motivated by the pursuit of monetary
compensation and less by work-related power and prestige. Yet employees often have
far less ability to negotiate custom compensation packages than do mangers.
It is far more difficult to design tax-favored compensation packages for
employees who are not able to negotiate for custom-tailored forms of compensation.
These employees will typically prefer to be compensated in the form of cash wages
because receiving cash wages grants the employees flexibility in how to spend the
wages. Cash wages are almost always fully taxable; providing compensation in a taxfavored form typically requires limiting employee’s flexibility in how to use the
compensation. Employees who are not in a position to custom negotiate a
compensation package to design limitations that are not overly restrictive with respect to
the employees’ goals will thus often prefer to have their compensation fully taxed in
order to maintain the flexibility of cash wages.
The incentive bargains managers reach with employees are also influenced by
tax provisions that are regulatory in nature – tax provisions designed to encourage or
discourage certain behaviors, in a Pigouvian fashion. In the U.S., for instance,
beginning in 2014, employers may be subject to tax penalties for not providing their

employees with affordable employer-sponsored health insurance.25 U.S. tax law also
includes a number of tax provisions that may penalize employers who offer fringe
benefits if the employer offers the fringe benefits in a proscribed fashion.
C. How Monetary Capital Providers Respond to Taxation
Monetary capital providers are generally motivated by the desire to secure the
highest possible returns to their investments. To this end, monetary capital providers
sometimes also desire control rights over the business enterprises they invest in. The
major influence of tax laws is to make certain forms of investments more tax-favorable
than others, thus encouraging monetary capital providers to structure their investments
in a tax-favorable fashion.
We have already noted that most developed country tax systems treat debt
investments more tax-favorably than equity investments.26 This bias for debt financing
both leads monetary capital providers to invest through debt instruments rather than
equity investments and encourages monetary capital providers to develop hybrid
financial instruments with the tax characteristics of debt but some of the economic
characteristics of equity.
Beyond the bias for debt financing, international tax rules also have a strong
influence on investor behavior. It is often possible to make investments more tax
favorable by structuring the investments as cross-border transactions. The flaws in the
international tax rules of the U.S. and other nations are legendary.27 The desire to
minimize tax liabilities by exploiting gaps in the relevant international tax rules strongly
influences the bargains reaches between managers and monetary capital providers.
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IV. Conclusion
Although the goal of minimizing excess burden supports designing a
comprehensive tax system that is neutral with respect the economic decisions affecting
the business enterprise, it is impossible to achieve a completely neutral tax system in
practice. This is especially true in countries like the U.S. and Japan that rely on income
taxes, as income is an inherently nebulous concept. Taxpayers find it all too easy to
play tax minimization games by restructuring transactions so as to alter the character,
timing, or jurisdiction of the transaction with respect to tax laws.
To the extent the goal of promoting distribution policy leads governments to
enact progressive income tax schedules, such as in the U.S. and Japan as well as in
most other nations, the distortions created by non-comprehensive tax bases are
multiplied. And, even recognizing that it is not possible to design a fully comprehensive
tax base, governments fall far short of what might theoretically be possible. The goals
of promoting desirable behavior and enacting fiscal stimulus often lead policymakers to
enact tax preferences or penalties in order to achieve non-tax-policy-related ends.
Furthermore, politicians frequently prioritize rewarding narrow interest groups over
providing for the general welfare; real-world tax laws are thus rife with special provisions
intended to reward narrow interest groups.
Tax laws thus create many biases that affect the behavior of managers,
employees, and monetary capital providers. Many volumes have been written
analyzing subsets of these biases, and there is still considerably more to be said. In
this chapter, our goal has been only to provide a high-level overview of the tax policy
perspective on the interactions between tax law and enterprise law, and to sketch a few
examples of how the nature of tax law influences the incentive bargains reached
between managers, employees, and monetary capital providers. It is important for
those interested in tax policy and those interested in enterprise policy to understand one
another’s perspectives. Only through communication and collaboration can we combat
the ways in which tax laws create problems for enterprise law or use tax law as a tool
for correcting biases in enterprise law.

